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FISHER V. TEXAS:
THE LIMITS OF EXHAUSTION AND THE FUTURE OF RACE-
CONSCIOUS UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS
john a. powell and Stephen Menendian*
INTRODUCTION
Following the Hopwood decision, which struck down the Univer-
sity of Texas’s affirmative action policy, the University of Texas
(“UT”) and the State of Texas sought new ways to promote diversity
in higher education that were consistent with the prevailing inter-
pretation of the United States Constitution.1 The Texas State
Legislature narrowly passed a law granting the top ten percent of
each graduating high school class in the state automatic admission
to UT.2 Known as the Texas Top Ten Percent Plan (TPP), it both
recognized underlying patterns of racial residential segregation and
relied on them to generate diversity in the UT undergraduate stu-
dent body.3 A few years later, UT adopted a race-conscious
* john a. powell is the Director of the Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society
and The Robert D. Haas Chancellor’s Chair in Equity and Inclusion, Berkeley School of Law.
He does not capitalize his name. Stephen Menendian is the Assistant Director at the Haas
Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at UC Berkeley. The authors would like to thank
Kaloma Cardwell, Darren Arquero and Lilibeth Cielo for their research assistance and Sarah
Diem for her suggestions and feedback.
1. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
2. See LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING
POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 73 (2003). For a brief synopsis of the effects of the Hop-
wood decision and a discussion of the background of the Ten Percent Plan, see NICHOLAS
WEBBER, KIRWAN INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY, ANALYSIS OF THE TEXAS
TEN PERCENT PLAN, (2007), available at http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/reports/2007/08_
2007_DemMerit_AnalysisofTXTenPercent.pdf. It should be noted that the plan is a misno-
mer. At the urging of the University of Texas, the Texas State Legislature amended the
percent plan law to cap the number of students admitted under this policy to no more than
seventy-five percent of the total undergraduate admissions for that year. The University of Texas
at Austin to Automatically Admit Top 8 Percent of High School Graduates for 2011, U. TEX. AT
AUSTIN (Sept. 16, 2009), http://www.utexas.edu/news/2009/09/16/top8_percent/. There-
fore, the exact percentage changes from year to year. Each fall, ascending high school
juniors are notified exactly what percentile of the ascending class will qualify for automatic
admission under the Ten Percent Plan. In 2011, that was the top eight-percent. See Automatic
Admission, U. TEX. AT AUSTIN (last updated Sept. 16, 2013), http://bealonghorn.utexas.edu/
freshmen/decisions/automatic-admission; TEXAS LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITI-
ZENS, THE TOP TEN PERCENT PLAN: ESSENTIAL FACTS FOR PARENTS, STUDENTS, SCHOOL
ADMINISTRATORS AND COUNSELORS, available at http://www.lulactx.org/TTTP_essential_facts_
NP_FINAL.pdf.
3. Residential segregation is the underlying structural feature that allows the Ten Per-
cent Plan to generate student body diversity. See Kalena E. Cortes, Do Bans on Affirmative
Action Hurt Minority Students? Evidence from the Texas Top 10% Plan, 29 ECON. OF EDUC. REV.
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admissions policy modeled after the University of Michigan Law
School’s admissions program, which the Supreme Court upheld in
Grutter v. Bollinger.4
Consequently, UT currently employs two pools as part of its un-
dergraduate admissions process. The first pool includes applicants
automatically admitted by law under the TPP. The second pool in-
cludes applicants not admitted under the TPP. These applicants are
subject to a holistic application review that, in an effort to create a
more diverse student body, considers the race of the individual ap-
plicant as one of many factors.
The University of Texas denied admission to Abigail Fisher, a
white woman who fell outside of the top ten percent of her graduat-
ing high school class. Ms. Fisher sued the University of Texas,
arguing that UT’s limited consideration of race in undergraduate
admissions violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Specifically, she claimed that UT discriminated
against her on the basis of race because she had academic creden-
tials that were superior to some non-white applicants admitted
under the holistic admissions review.5 She also argued that the
1100, 1113–14 (2010) (Figure 1 shows the location of Texas Higher Education Opportunity
Project (THEOP) Universities and Minority Populations and illustrates that the Hispanic
population in Texas is concentrated on the western and southern part of the state and that
the Black population is concentrated on the eastern part of the state); id. at 1111–12 (“Pro-
ponents of the plan believed the new admissions policy would restore campus diversity
because of the high degree of segregation among high schools in Texas. . . .”); see also
GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 2, at 70–74 (describing the formulation of various proposals,
including the introduction of the Ten Percent idea by UT professor David Montejano); J.
Phillip Thompson and Sarah Tobias, The Texas Ten Percent Plan, 43 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST
1121, 1125–29 (2000); Julie Berry Cullen et al., Jockeying for Position: Strategic High School Choice
Under Texas Top Ten Percent Plan, 97 J. PUB. ECON. 32, 33 (2013) (“The admission guarantee
ensures that students at low-achieving high schools, who tend to be disproportionately poor
and minority, are equally represented among those automatically granted admission.”).
4. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Alison Schmauch Somin, A Lady or a Ti-
ger?: Thoughts on Fisher v. University of Texas and the Future of Race Preferences in America, ENGAGE:
THE JOURNAL OF THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY PRACTICE GROUPS, Vol. 14, Issue 3 (Oct. 2013) avail-
able at http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/a-lady-or-a-tiger-thoughts-on-fisher-v-
university-of-texas-and-the-future-of-race-preferences-in-america.
5. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No.
11-345). UT disputes Ms. Fisher’s claims regarding the strength of her academic credentials
relative to students admitted through the second admissions pool. According to UT’s brief to
the Fifth Circuit, Abigail Fisher “would not have been admitted to the Fall 2008 freshman
class even if she had received a perfect [Personal Achievement Index] score,” a score that is
used during the holistic review process and for candidates who fall below the top 10% of
their high school class. Brief for Respondents at 15, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S.Ct.
2411 (2013) (No. 11-345). Moreover, only one African-American and four Hispanic appli-
cants with lower combined application scores were offered admission to UT’s summer
program, compared to forty-two white applicants with equal or lower scores to Abigail
Fisher’s. Id. Finally, 168 African-American and Hispanic applicants with identical or higher
scores than Abigail Fishers were denied admission to the program. Id. at 16.
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success of the TPP in generating student body diversity at UT ren-
dered further consideration of race unnecessary.6
Both the District Court and the Fifth Circuit denied her claims.
They held that UT’s holistic admissions policy satisfied the constitu-
tional standards announced or clarified in Grutter regarding the use
of race in admissions in higher education and that UT’s policy was
“narrowly tailored” to serve a “compelling interest in attaining a di-
verse student body.”7 Ms. Fisher appealed to the Supreme Court,
which granted certiorari to hear her case in the 2012 term.8
In the spring of 2013, affirmative action advocates and oppo-
nents braced for the Supreme Court’s Fisher ruling with
anticipation and apprehension.9 Those opposed to affirmative ac-
tion hoped that the Court would use Fisher to overturn or severely
limit Grutter, as the Court’s composition had since changed. Five
conservative Justices controlled the Court in its 2012 term, with
Grutter-dissenter Justice Anthony Kennedy holding the decisive vote.
Justice Alito, viewed by many as hostile to affirmative action, re-
placed Justice O’Connor, the author of the Court’s Grutter decision.
Furthermore, the recusal of Justice Elena Kagan because of her
prior involvement in the case as Solicitor General hampered the
Court’s liberal wing. Justice Kagan holds the seat previously held by
Justice John Paul Stevens, a member of the Grutter majority.
Advocates of affirmative action hoped for a narrow ruling. In pre-
vious cases, Justice Kennedy rhetorically rejected colorblindness
(“The enduring hope is that race should not matter; the reality is
that too often it does”10) and expressly supported Justice Powell’s
6. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at 38–42. The undergraduate student body of
the UT in the Fall of 2010 was 50.4% white, 20.0% Hispanic, 17.9% Asian, and 4.6% African-
American, although those numbers vary by gender. For example, the ratio of Black females
to males is roughly 2-1. Updated reports on the demographics of enrolled first-time freshmen
are available from UT at Top 10% Reports, U. TEX. AT AUSTIN (last updated Jan. 2, 2014),
http://www.utexas.edu/student/admissions/research/admission_reports.html.
7. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 608, 612 (W.D. Texas 2009),
aff’d, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011).
8. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345); Fisher v. Univ.
of Tex. at Austin, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012) (granting petition for writ of certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit).
9. Fisher, 133 S.Ct. at 2411; Jeffrey Toobin, The Other Big Supreme Court Case, THE NEW
YORKER (May 1, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2012/05/the-
other-big-supreme-court-case.html; Lyle Denniston, Argument preview: Is affirmative action about
to end?, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 9, 2012, 12:02 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/10/ar
gument-preview-is-affirmative-action-about-to-end/.
10. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 11 No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 787
(2007). Justice Kennedy’s rhetoric reflects his concern that a formalism and dogmatic inter-
pretation of a colorblind constitution may ignore and insulate the realities of unequal
educational provision. He refused to join passages of the plurality in Parents Involved on this
basis, noting:
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legal conclusion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke11 that
there is a compelling governmental interest in the “attainment of a
diverse student body.”12 Since Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke also
formed the basis of Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter,13 it
seemed unlikely that Justice Kennedy would vote to overturn Grut-
ter, despite his dissent in that case.14 Furthermore, Justice Kennedy
staked ground beyond Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion when he more
recently asserted that “[a] compelling [government] interest exists
in avoiding racial isolation . . . [and] achiev[ing] a diverse student
population.”15 Although Justice Kennedy had never voted to up-
hold a particular affirmative action plan, his previous opinions
indicate an appreciation of not only the empirical reality of une-
qual educational opportunities by race, but also the moral
dimension of affirmative action. In Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy
The plurality opinion is at least open to the interpretation that the Constitution re-
quires school districts to ignore the problem of de facto resegregation in schooling. I
cannot endorse that conclusion. To the extent the plurality opinion suggests the Con-
stitution mandates that state and local school authorities must accept the status quo of
racial isolation in schools, it is, in my view, profoundly mistaken.
Id. at 788.
11. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Allan Bakke, a white male, had twice applied for admission to
the University of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected twice. The school re-
served sixteen places in each entering class of one hundred for “qualified” minorities,
attempting to redress persistent and unfair minority exclusions from the medical field. Bakke
argued that he was excluded from admission solely on the basis of race. Id. at 265–66. The
Court in Bakke was deeply divided and no opinion gained majority support. Justice Powell’s
opinion was considered, under some tests, controlling, and announced the judgment of the
court. In Grutter, Justice O’Connor did not resolve the issue of how to determine binding
precedent in fractured opinions, but did endorse Justice Powell’s opinion as the correct state-
ment of law. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.
12. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311, 314. In his Grutter dissent, Justice Kennedy stated that “[t]he
opinion by Justice Powell [in Bakke], in my view, states the correct rule for resolving this
case.” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
13. See discussion supra note 11. The Court’s opinion in Grutter draws heavily from Jus-
tice Powell’s opinion in Bakke, with thirty-one references and citations in the majority
opinion alone. 539 U.S. at 311–44.
14. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The reason for Justice Ken-
nedy’s dissent in Grutter was not disagreement with the majority’s endorsement of the
standard of law announced by Justice Powell in Bakke, but rather his disagreement over the
Court’s application of that standard with respect to narrow tailoring, and what he viewed as a
flawed narrow tailoring analysis.
15. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 797–98 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring). For more on
the importance of Justice Kennedy’s assertion that a compelling interest exists in avoiding
racial isolation, see john a. powell & Stephen Menendian, Parents Involved: Mantle of Brown,
The Shadow of Plessy, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 631, 632 (2007) (“Justice Kennedy’s opinion is
also significant because of his holding that there exist compelling government interests in
the [sic] avoiding racial isolation and in achieving a diverse student population in primary
education. Along with the four dissenting Justices, a majority of the Justices on the Court
have now voiced approval of a new compelling interest that may sustain race-conscious poli-
cies under the strict scrutiny framework.”).
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proclaimed that “[t]his Nation has a moral and ethical obligation to
fulfill its historic commitment to creating an integrated society that
ensures equal opportunity for all of its children.”16
Supporters of UT’s admissions policy feared that even a narrow
decision—one that upheld the principles first announced in Bakke,
left Grutter undisturbed, but overturned UT’s race-conscious admis-
sions plan—would chill the already sparse race-conscious
admissions plans still in operation. Even if universities could suc-
cessfully defend such plans under the legal standards announced in
Fisher, the overturning of a major university policy would ultimately
receive more press and invite more litigation than the subtle doctri-
nal silver linings or nuanced parsing of that decision. TPP
supporters could point to the consequences of previous decisions as
examples. Following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Parents In-
volved and Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education,17 which
struck down voluntary integration plans in Louisville, Kentucky and
Seattle, Washington, school districts around the nation seemed
more reticent about integration and less willing to pursue that goal
as educational policy.18
Ultimately, the terse 7–1 decision in Fisher is more remarkable for
what it did not say than for what it did. The Court did not strike
down UT’s holistic admissions policy, did not overrule Grutter, did
not purport to revise or otherwise alter the constitutional standards
announced in Grutter, did not hold that UT’s admissions policy
failed the narrow tailoring test, did not suggest deficiencies in the
UT policy, and barely mentioned the TPP. One reading of Fisher is
that it introduced no new law, but that it was merely a black letter
restatement of Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz v. Bollinger.19 This reading is
not only suggested by the Court itself,20 but is also advanced by de-
fenders of affirmative action and UT’s admissions policies, who
16. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 797.
17. Meredith, 548 U.S. 938 (2006), was argued in tandem with Parents Involved.
18. Indeed, the Seattle School District abandoned its integrative efforts following the
Parents Involved decision. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. IV, 377 F.3d 949, 958 (9th Cir. 2004).




19. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)
20. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421 (“In Grutter, the Court approved the plan at issue upon
concluding that it was not a quota, was sufficiently flexible, was limited in time, and followed
‘serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives.’ As noted above, the
parties do not challenge, and the Court therefore does not consider, the correctness of that
determination.”) (internal citations omitted).
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would prefer to avoid weakening Grutter.21 This reading is unpersua-
sive, though appealing. Upon a closer reading, Fisher is a departure
from settled law in a number of critical respects.
This Article investigates the potential ramifications of Fisher v.
Texas and the future of race-conscious university admissions. Al-
though one cannot predict the ultimate significance of the Fisher
decision, its brief and pregnant statements of law portends an in-
creasingly perilous course for traditional affirmative action
programs. Part I explores the opinions filed in Fisher, with a particu-
lar emphasis on Justice Kennedy’s opinion on behalf of the Court.
We focus on the ways in which the Fisher decision departs from pre-
cedent, proscribes new limits on the use of race in university
admissions, and tightens requirements for narrow tailoring.
Part II investigates the limits of the exhaustion requirement as a
matter of logic, law, and policy. We focus on the necessity and ex-
haustion prongs of narrow tailoring with respect to the use of race
in admissions. We will complicate the necessity analysis by illustrat-
ing the practical difficulties of employing race-neutral alternatives
and by highlighting how this inquiry is fraught with administrative
and conceptual challenges.
Part III underscores the challenges presented in Part II by at-
tempting to navigate the distinction between general race-
consciousness and the use of individual racial classifications. We will
explore the possibilities for university admissions committees to
pursue racial and socio-economic diversity, including the opportu-
nity-enrollment model. As a reference, we will survey integrative
alternatives used in the wake of the Parents Involved decisions and
suggest how colleges and universities could apply a similar set of
principles and methods. We will also note the challenges facing
such approaches on the scale of university admissions.
We will conclude by arguing that race-conscious admissions are
necessary, yet increasingly administratively challenging. The stan-
dards for narrow tailoring demand expertise beyond the skills and
the resources of university admissions committees and call for more
administratively cumbersome university standards. Given the extant
realities of our educational system, courts should provide more lee-
way, not less, to universities pursuing the compelling interests of
promoting student body diversity and reducing racial isolation. In
the absence or relative unavailability of such resources and techni-
cal expertise, and until such deference from courts is forthcoming,
21. See, e.g., Elise Boddie, Commentary on Fisher: In with a Bang, Out with a Fizzle, SCOTUS-
BLOG (June 24, 2013, 11:05 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/fisher-v-university-
of-texas-in-with-a-bang-out-with-a-fizzle.
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universities should rely on the Supreme Court’s safe harbor by ag-
gressively pursuing viable race-neutral alternatives with promising
outcomes.
I. NEW DEPARTURES IN FISHER V. TEXAS
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Fisher purports to do little more
than to correct the Fifth Circuit’s error in applying established law.
However, the Court’s terse opinion departs from established prece-
dent in several important ways while creating new law. This Part will
explore these departures. The Court ultimately remanded the case
to the Fifth Circuit for reconsideration under the standards an-
nounced in its decision.22 The Court explained that because the
case arose from cross-motions for summary judgment, rather than
appeal after a trial, the lower courts in the first instance must assess
whether UT offered evidence “sufficient . . . to prove that its admis-
sions program is narrowly tailored to obtain the educational
benefits of diversity.”23
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, Justices
Scalia and Thomas authored concurring opinions, and Justice Gins-
burg delivered a brief dissenting opinion. Justice Scalia’s opinion
merely notes that he joined the Court’s opinion in full, despite his
objection to Grutter, because Petitioner did not ask the Court to
overrule Grutter.24 Justice Thomas’ lengthy concurrence, in contrast,
calls for the Court to overturn Grutter.25 Justice Thomas also parts
with the opinion of the Court by asserting that the interest in racial
diversity is not compelling, comparing so-called “benign” intentions
to those of slaveholders and Jim Crow segregationists.26
22. Fisher, 133 S.Ct. at 2421 (“[B]ut fairness to the litigants and the courts that heard the
case requires that it be remanded so that the admissions process can be considered and
judged under a correct analysis.”). Following the Court’s decision, the Fifth Circuit denied
the University of Texas’s request that it remand the case to the District Court for further
proceedings. See Appellee’s Statement Concerning Further Proceedings on Remand at 7,
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 09-50822, (5th Cir. July 23, 2013), available at http://
tarltonguides.law.utexas.edu/loader.php?type=d&id=812884; Proposed Schedule for Supple-
mental Briefing and Response to Appellee’s Statement Concerning Further Proceedings on
Remand at 9, Fischer v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 09-50822, available at http://lgdata.s3-
website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/docs/971/812890/PROPOSED_SCHEDULE_FOR_SUP
PLEMENTAL_BRIEFING_AND.pdf
23. See Fisher, 133 S.Ct. at 2414.
24. Id. at 2422 (Scalia, J., concurring).
25. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 2430 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that “segregationists similarly asserted
that segregation was not only benign, but good for black students. . . . Following in these
inauspicious footsteps, the University would have us believe that its discrimination is likewise
benign. I think the lesson of history is clear enough: Racial discrimination is never benign.”).
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Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the Court’s Fisher decision
is that the members of the Court split by a 7–1 vote, with only Jus-
tice Ginsburg dissenting. In Parents Involved, Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Stevens joined Justice Breyer’s eighty-page dissent,
which not only argued that the school district’s limited use of race
to promote integration should survive strict scrutiny but also that
efforts to promote educational diversity should be subject to a less
stringent standard of review.27
By noting the legal and ethical difference between segregative
and integrative efforts Justice Breyer echoed Justice Stevens’ fa-
mous admonition that subjecting both “invidious” and “benign”
racial classifications to the same standard of review is akin to equat-
ing a “welcome mat” and a “no trespassing sign”.28 As Justice Breyer
wrote, “no case . . . has ever held that the test of ‘strict scrutiny’
means that all racial classifications—no matter whether they seek to
include or exclude—must in practice be treated the same.”29 He
explained that “a more lenient standard than ‘strict scrutiny’
should apply in the present context” and that doing so “would not
imply abandonment of judicial efforts carefully to determine the
need for race-conscious criteria and the criteria’s tailoring in light
of the need.”30 Although protesting the plurality’s use of strict scru-
tiny review, Justice Breyer acquiesced to the realities of the Court’s
jurisprudence and nonetheless applied strict scrutiny review in his
analysis. He concluded that the voluntary integration plans under
review in Parents Involved survive constitutional scrutiny under strict
scrutiny or any lesser standard.31
Given the length, intensity, and logic of his dissenting opinion in
Parents Involved, it is puzzling that Justice Breyer would join Justice
Kennedy’s opinion in Fisher. Justice Kennedy’s statement of law is
inconsistent with Breyer’s equal protection jurisprudence. Simi-
larly, it is puzzling that Justice Sonia Sotomayor, a more recent
appointee and Justice Souter’s replacement, would join Justice Ken-
nedy’s opinion. In her autobiography, Justice Sotomayor stressed
the value of affirmative action in higher education, citing herself as
27. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
28. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 245 (1995) (“The consistency that
the Court espouses would disregard the difference between a ‘No Trespassing’ sign and a
welcome mat.”).
29. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 832 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In his view, the purpose of
the Equal Protection Clause was to “forbid[ ] practices that lead to racial exclusion.” Id. at
829.
30. Id. at 836.
31. Id. at 863 (“To show that the school assignment plans here meet the requirements of
the Constitution, I have written at exceptional length.”).
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an example.32 Her pointed questions during oral argument, often
critical of the Petitioner, reinforce that reading.33 By joining Justice
Kennedy’s opinion, Justices Breyer and Sotomayor establish, for the
first time, that seven Justices endorse the proposition that the use of
racial classifications in university admissions is subject to strict scru-
tiny review and that strict scrutiny demands the kind of tailoring set
out in Justice Kennedy’s opinion. Although not a change in law,
this represents a symbolic departure and appears to consolidate the
re-orientation of equal protection jurisprudence announced in
Bakke away from the principles announced in Carolene Products.34
The tenuous hold of strict scrutiny over all racial classifications, in-
vidious or remedial, by just five Justices appears to have given way to
broader support, at least insofar as the votes of the Justices in Fisher
are predictive.
Given their support for the use of racial classifications in reme-
dial and integrative public policy, it is not evident why Justices
Breyer and Sotomayor would join Justice Kennedy’s opinion and
further entrench the view that strict scrutiny applies to all racial
classifications. Possibly, these Justices were able to secure a nar-
rower ruling by joining Justice Kennedy’s opinion.35 For this to be
true, Justice Kennedy or the other conservative Justices must have
been willing or have indicated a willingness to announce a more
stringent standard of law, or even to strike down UT’s policy on the
merits unless Justices Breyer or Sotomayor joined them. Another
possibility is that Justices Breyer and Sotomayor were persuaded to
32. See SONIA SOTOMAYOR, MY BELOVED WORLD 119 (2013) (describing a conversation
she had during the admissions process and after she received an acceptance letter from
Princeton); id. at 145–46, 191 (discussing the need for affirmative action to open doors).
Further, in an interview with TIME magazine while Fisher was pending, Justice Sotomayor was
asked whether affirmative action is working today. Although she declined to speak specifi-
cally about her views on affirmative action, Justice Sotomayor expressed her belief that the
country will not reach “complete equality” unless “employers and everyone else are sensitive
to the fact that it is a valuable goal for society.” Belinda Luscombe, 10 Questions for Sonia
Sotomayor, TIME, Feb. 11, 2013, at 60.
33. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 81–82, Fisher 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345)
[hereinafter Fisher Oral Argument] (Justice Sonia Sotomayor: “So you don’t want to overrule
Grutter, you just want to gut it.” Fisher’s attorney: “Excuse me?” Justice Sonia Sotomayor: “You just
want to gut it. You don’t want to overrule it, but you just want to gut it.” Fisher’s attorney:
“Well—” Justice Sonia Sotomayor: “Now you want to tell universities that once you reach a cer-
tain number, then you can’t use race anymore.”).
34. See Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court, 2012 Term — Foreword: Equality Divided, 127
HARV. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2013). See generally, john a. powell, Constitutionalism and the Extreme Poor:
Neo-Dred Scott and the Contemporary “Discrete and Insular Minorities,” 60 DRAKE L. REV. 1069,
1075–79 (2012) (discussing the importance of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152-53 n. 4 (1938) and its function).
35. In other words, Justice Kennedy may either have expressed or implied a willingness
to strike down UT’s plan unless other Justices joined a narrower opinion.
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join the Court majority in the interests of preserving the Court’s
institutional legitimacy by avoiding another deeply divided and po-
litically contentious Court decision near the end of the term.
Muting the Fisher decision may have been a tactical concession by
both wings of the Court in a volatile term with looming victories
and defeats for both progressives and conservatives in landmark
marriage equality and voting rights cases.36 The liberal Justices may
also have been more willing to acquiesce since Justice Kagan’s
recusal weakened their position.
If these were considerations, their joining the majority may have
little predictive significance. Regardless, their decision to join the
majority helped deepen the precedent that all racial classifica-
tions—regardless of intent—are subject to strict scrutiny review.37
Furthermore, by joining Justice Kennedy, Justices Breyer and
Sotomayor have lent their imprimatur to the proposition that con-
sideration of race requires exhaustion of race-neutral alternatives.
This is the second way in which Fisher departs from previous case
law.
The most important aspect of Fisher is the Court’s holding re-
garding the exhaustion of “workable race-neutral alternatives.”38
Grutter instructed that narrow tailoring requires “serious, good faith
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives.”39 However,
Grutter also cautioned that “narrow tailoring does not require ex-
haustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative.”40 To the
contrary, Justice Kennedy’s Fisher opinion asserts that “the review-
ing court must ultimately be satisfied that no workable race-neutral
alternatives would produce the educational benefits of diversity.”41
He explained that consideration of race-neutral alternatives is nec-
essary, but insufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny.42
36. See Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (holding that key provisions of
the Voting Rights Act were unconstitutional); U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (holding
that the Defense of Marriage Act’s definition of marriage was unconstitutional).
37. Again, this is the first time that seven Justices have clearly endorsed the proposition
that all race-based classifications, whether benign or invidious, are subject to strict scrutiny
review.
38. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420 (“But strict scrutiny imposes on the university the ultimate
burden of demonstrating, before turning to racial classifications, that available, workable
race-neutral alternatives do not suffice.”).
39. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339.
40. Id. at 309.
41. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420. Admittedly, there is a difference between “every conceiva-
ble” and “every workable” alternative, but it seems clear that the Grutter and Fisher decisions
are in tension in this respect. Fisher’s more stringent exhaustion standard now replaces Grut-
ter’s “good faith consideration.”
42. Id. (“Consideration by the university is of course necessary, but it is not sufficient to
satisfy strict scrutiny. . . .”).
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The exhaustion requirement represents a departure from Grut-
ter. Fisher appears to have re-written Grutter’s requirement of good
faith consideration of race-neutral alternatives into a more stringent
exhaustion requirement.43 Justice Kennedy does, however, temper
the exhaustion requirement with the caveat that a non-racial ap-
proach must produce the educational benefits of diversity “about as
well and at tolerable administrative expense.”44
In addition to mandating exhaustion rather than mere consider-
ation of race-neutral alternatives, the requirement that universities
seriously consider workable race-neutral alternatives has been su-
perseded by the requirement that reviewing courts be satisfied that
these alternatives will not suffice. This represents a third departure
from Grutter. In Fisher, the Court shifts responsibility for assessing
the viability of workable race-neutral alternatives from the univer-
sity to the courts. In Grutter, this element of narrow tailoring was to
be conducted in “good faith” by the university.45 In Fisher, however,
the “reviewing court” must be “satisfied” that “no workable race-
neutral alternative” would suffice.46
The Court also tightened narrow tailoring in other critical re-
spects. The primary error the Supreme Court found with the Fifth
Circuit’s decision in Fisher is that it accorded too much deference to
the university in evaluating whether the program was narrowly tai-
lored. The Court in Grutter suggested that courts offer some
deference, grounded in First Amendment interests, to a Univer-
sity’s pursuit of its pedagogical goals, including the selection of its
own student body.47 Drawing from Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion,
43. This re-writing is semantically plausible depending on the meaning or construction
of the words “serious, good faith consideration.” “Serious” could be given more weight than
the Court may have suggested in Grutter. In that reading, “serious” carries some of the work
that is now being offloaded to other words in a revised standard. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339.
44. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420. (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6
(1986)).
45. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339–40 (“Petitioner and the United States argue that the Law
School’s plan is not narrowly tailored because race-neutral means exist to obtain the educa-
tional benefits of student body diversity that the Law School seeks. We disagree. Narrow
tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative . . . Nar-
row tailoring does, however, require serious, good faith consideration of workable race-
neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university seeks.”).
46. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420.
47. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329. “We have long recognized that, given the important
purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated
with the university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tra-
dition.” Id. The Court continued: “In announcing the principle of student body diversity as a
compelling state interest, Justice Powell invoked our cases recognizing a constitutional di-
mension, grounded in the First Amendment, of educational autonomy: ‘The freedom of a
university to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student
body.’ ” Id. (citing Bakke, 348 U.S. at 312).
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the Court in Grutter reiterated that “good faith” in that judgment
will be presumed.48 Although Grutter’s language of deference is
found in passages discussing the compelling interest prong of strict
scrutiny,49 it is not evident that Grutter distinguished between the
deference in the narrow tailoring and compelling interest prongs as
finely as Fisher.50 This observation is bolstered by Justice Kennedy’s
dissent in Grutter, in which he complained that “[t]he Court con-
fuses deference to a university’s definition of its educational
objective [of student body diversity] with deference to the imple-
mentation of this goal.”51
In its narrow-tailoring analysis, the Grutter Court only demanded
“good faith” consideration of race-neutral alternatives by the uni-
versity.52 While purporting not to challenge “the correctness of that
The Law School’s educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its educa-
tional mission is one to which we defer. . . . Our scrutiny of the interest asserted by the
Law School is no less strict for taking into account complex educational judgments in
an area that lies primarily within the expertise of the university. Our holding today is
in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university’s academic
decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits. See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing,
474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985); Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 96,
n. 6 (1978); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319, n. 53 (opinion of Powell, J.).
. . . .
. . . Our conclusion that the Law School has a compelling interest in a diverse student
body is informed by our view that attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the
Law School’s proper institutional mission, and that “good faith” on the part of a uni-
versity is “presumed” absent “a showing to the contrary.” [Bakke,] 438 U.S. at 318–19.
Id. at 328–29 (emphasis added).
It should also be remembered that the Grutter dissenters strongly criticized the Court’s lan-
guage of deference more generally, viewing it as “inconsistent” with the “concept of strict
scrutiny.” See 539 U.S. at 350 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Nor does the Constitution counte-
nance the unprecedented deference the Court gives to the Law School, an approach
inconsistent with the very concept of ‘strict scrutiny.’); cf. id. at 328 (O’Connor, J., majority
opinion) (“The Law School’s educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its edu-
cational mission is one to which we defer.”).
48. Id. at 308.
49. Id. at 308, 329.
50. See infra Part II. The responsibility to consider race-neutral alternatives in good faith
rested with universities in Grutter. In Fisher, the courts, not the academic institution, must be
satisfied about the viability of race-neutral alternatives. This shift in responsibility under-
scores the degree of deference Grutter accorded universities, even in the narrow-tailoring
prong.
51. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). “In the context of university admis-
sions the objective of racial diversity can be accepted based on empirical data known to us,
but deference is not to be given with respect to the methods by which it is pursued.” Id.
Justice Kennedy is drawing a distinction between deference in the compelling interest and
narrow tailoring prongs. His reference to empirical data is presumably regarding social sci-
ence evidence on the benefits of diversity that would inform a university’s judgment.
52. Id. at 339. The language of “good faith” also suggests or implies some deference.
After all, as described supra at note 50, the court, not the university, must be satisfied about
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determination,” Justice Kennedy’s opinion on behalf of the Court
in Fisher adroitly excises this element out of the prevailing stan-
dard.53 As he explains, “Grutter did not hold that good faith would
forgive an impermissible consideration of race.”54 Yet, whether such
consideration of race is permissible or not depends, in large part,
on whether it is narrowly tailored. Demanding a permissible use of
race in the first instance introduces a circular logic that effectively
eliminates or minimizes the good faith element in this aspect of
narrow tailoring. The Grutter Court sanctioned “good faith consid-
eration of workable race-neutral alternatives. . . .”55 The Fisher Court
countenances neither mere ‘consideration’ nor simple ‘good faith’
but demands more.56
The tendency to conflate standards for the narrow tailoring and
compelling interest prongs, evident in Justice Kennedy’s critique of
the Fifth Circuit, inheres in the structure of strict scrutiny itself.
The required tailoring must account for the interest pursued and
cannot be acontextually analyzed. The Court, however, sometimes
conducts its narrow tailoring analysis entirely removed and ab-
stracted from the interest being evaluated. The exhaustion
requirement illustrates this deeper flaw in the Court’s narrow tailor-
ing analysis. Narrow tailoring, by definition, tailors to the interest
asserted. To determine whether a university’s use of race is nar-
rowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest requires
a careful understanding of that interest. The exhaustion require-
ment is not tailored to the interests asserted but appears to be
acontextually imported. Chief Justice Roberts’ plurality opinion in
Parents Involved is illustrative.
In Parents Involved, Chief Justice Roberts’ plurality opinion side-
stepped analyzing the racial diversity interest advanced by the
defendant-respondent school districts by asserting that, regardless
of the interest at stake, the plans were not narrowly tailored. Rob-
erts stated, “[t]he debate is not one we need to resolve, however,
because it is clear that the racial classifications employed by the dis-
tricts are not narrowly tailored. . . .”57 This makes little sense as a
the viability of workable race-neutral alternatives after Fisher, whereas in Grutter, the university
was responsible for considering alternatives, and then only in good faith.
53. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421.
54. Id.
55. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339.
56. Good faith only applies, in the view of the Fisher Court, if the use of race is already
narrowly tailored. Requiring that good faith only apply if the use of race is narrowly tailored
in the first place effectively writes the good faith requirement out of the narrow tailoring test.
57. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 726.
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matter of logic.58 After all, the interest asserted or accepted defines
the scope of narrow tailoring. The question of whether the interest
at issue was a broader or narrower concept of diversity necessarily
affects whether the means used to pursue that end are properly tai-
lored. Narrow tailoring is not an analysis without context, and yet
that is how the Chief Justice treated it in Parents Involved.
The Chief Justice’s handling of the relationship between the
compelling interest and narrow tailoring prongs in Parents Involved
is inconsistent with his questioning during oral argument in Fisher.
Chief Justice Roberts pressed Respondents to define the term “criti-
cal mass” so that he could determine whether the use of race was
narrowly tailored:
I understand my job, under our precedents, is to determine if
your use of race is narrowly tailored to a compelling interest.
The compelling interest you identify is attaining a critical mass
of minority students at the University of Texas, but you won’t
tell me what the critical mass is. How am I supposed to do the
job that our precedents say I should do?59
In Parents Involved, Roberts did not merely fail to follow the Court’s
precedents. He failed to do the job he adamantly suggested was
required.
One of the sources of confusion in narrow tailoring analysis is
the subtly shifting purposes of strict scrutiny over time. This is yet
another departure evident in Fisher. Strict scrutiny’s varied purposes
may individually suggest differing legal standards designed to serve
those ends. As those purposes change or shift in emphasis, so do
the legal standards that arise from them. Fisher’s articulation of nar-
row tailoring reflects a larger, mostly implicit, shift in the
underlying rationale for strict scrutiny.
In earlier racial classification cases, the Court explained that the
primary function of strict scrutiny was to screen for illegitimate mo-
tives.60 In contesting the application of strict scrutiny to all racial
58. See powell & Menendian, supra note 15, at 650–54 (providing a more detailed
parsing of Chief Justice Robert’s narrow tailoring analysis in Parents Involved).
59. Fisher Oral Argument, supra note 33, at 46. Chief Justice Roberts’s inconsistency sug-
gests a results-oriented jurisprudence. He either demands a precise definition of the
compelling interest or sidesteps such an inquiry entirely, depending on whether it serves his
presumed objective of striking down or limiting race-conscious policies.
60. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (explaining that heightened scru-
tiny applies because the Court must examine the statute’s purpose and justification to ensure
that the purpose is not “invidious discrimination.”). Many cases reiterated this basic ratio-
nale, albeit in slightly different formulations. In Loving v. Virginia, the Court explained that
“[t]he equal protection clause requires the consideration of whether the classifications
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classifications, various parties and several Justices argued that the
use of racial classifications in pursuit of remedial objectives or on
behalf of benignly motivated legislation should be subject to a
lower standard of review.61 By arguing that the purpose of strict
scrutiny was to screen for illegitimate motives and saying that good
intentions cannot be presumed, conservative jurists applied strict
scrutiny even to ostensibly ‘benign’ or ‘remedial’ legislation.62 As
the Court explained in Croson, “[a]bsent searching judicial inquiry
into the justification for such race-based measures,” courts have no
way to determine what “classifications are ‘benign’ or ‘remedial’
and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions
of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.”63 However, in more
recent cases, another ground or rationale for strict scrutiny is in-
creasingly evident.
In Grutter, the Court explained its rationale for strict scrutiny:
“We apply strict scrutiny to all racial classifications to ‘smoke out’
illegitimate uses of race by assuring that [the government] is pursuing a
goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.”64 In
other words, the Court introduced an additional rationale for strict
scrutiny: balancing the costs of a racial classification against its ben-
efits. The Court’s assertion that the government’s use of race is
“important enough” to justify its service on behalf of a compelling
interest suggests an explicit cost/benefit rationale. The Court’s
anti-classification jurisprudence has rested more prominently on
the latter rationale, while it often frames its analysis in terms of the
drawn by any statute constitutes an arbitrary and invidious discrimination.” 388 U.S. 1, 10
(1967). Two decades later, a similar parsing was found in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (“[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate
uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to
warrant use of a highly suspect tool.”).
61. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 245 (1995) (Souter, Ginsberg and
Breyer dissenting) (“The consistency that the Court espouses would disregard the difference
between a “No Trespassing” sign and a welcome mat. [. . .] The Court’s explanation for
treating dissimilar race based decisions as though they were equally objectionable is a sup-
posed inability to differentiate between ‘invidious’ and ‘benign’ discrimination.”). More
precisely, in cases before Croson and Adarand, the Court was deeply divided on whether strict
scrutiny review applied to all racial classifications. Previous cases had established that strict
scrutiny was reserved for cases involving invidious discrimination but that ‘benign’ or ‘reme-
dial’ legislation employing racial classifications was subject to a lesser standard of review, at
least with respect to Congressional authority to pass remedial legislation through the enforce-
ment clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 638
(1990) overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Brad Snyder, How
the Conservatives Canonized Brown v. Board of Education, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 383, 480–93 (2000).
62. For an insightful analysis of these shifting rationales, see generally Reva B. Siegel,
Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over
Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004).
63. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
64. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (internal quotations omitted; emphasis added).
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former. The decisive role of Justice Kennedy on the Court may ex-
plain this shift.
A careful reading of Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence reveals a
deep concern for individual dignity and autonomy, which he be-
lieves racial classifications impugn.65 His emphasis on dignity may
be characterized as part of a broader jurisprudence of individual-
ism.66 Justice Kennedy, like Justice O’Connor, is committed to the
preservation of elite institutions, but is troubled by the fact that ad-
missions (the allocation of a societally important and scarce
resource) may be reduced to a single or a few factors rather than
looking at an individual as a whole. Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence
suggests that he is attracted to policies and plans that view people as
individuals rather than as a single metric, whether that be SAT
scores or race.
Typical of his description of the harms of racial classification, Jus-
tice Kennedy asserted in Parents Involved that “[t]o be forced to live
under a state-mandated racial label is inconsistent with the dignity
of individuals in our society.”67 Yet, in Fisher, he asserts, quoting
Croson, that the rationale for strict scrutiny rests on the ground that
the government must prove that “the reasons for any [racial] classi-
fications [are] clearly identified and unquestionably legitimate.”68
Despite his assertion to the contrary, neither “clear identification”
65. See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (“[o]ne of the principal reasons
race is treated as a forbidden classification is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a
person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities.”).
66. In some cases, Justice Kennedy’s individualism acquires romantic overtones. In
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, Justice Kennedy famously wrote: “At the heart of liberty is the
right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life. . . .” 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). This core value finds expressions not only in his
race cases but was also prominent in his Windsor opinion. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675, 2689 (2013). It undoubtedly informed his decision to join the dissenters in the
landmark 2012 term decision, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, in which the Court narrowly
upheld the Affordable Care Act from constitutional challenge. 132 S. Ct. 2566. In oral argu-
ment, Kennedy posed a question to the Solicitor General that suggested his concern over the
ways in which the law may infringe individual liberty: “Here the government is saying that the
Federal Government has a duty to tell the individual citizen that it must act, and that is
different from what we have in previous cases, and that changes the relationship of the Fed-
eral Government to the individual in a very fundamental way.” Kennedy: Individual Mandate
Fundamentally Changes Relationship of Gov’t., REAL CLEAR POLITICS (March 27, 2012), http://
www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2012/03/27/kennedy_individual_mandate_fundamentally
_changes_relationship_of_govt.html (quoting Justice Kennedy).
67. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 797. Journalists and Court observers have increasingly
noted Justice Kennedy’s “rhetoric of dignity.” See, e.g., Liz Halloran, Explaining Justice Kennedy:
The Dignity Factor, NPR (June 28, 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/06/
27/196280855/explaining-justice-kennedy-the-dignity-factor; Noah Feldman, The United
States of Justice Kennedy, BLOOMBERG (May 30, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-
05-30/how-it-became-the-united-states-of-justice-kennedy-noah-feldman.html (“Kennedy
started with what is undoubtedly his favorite constitutional concept: dignity.”).
68. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2413 (internal quotations omitted).
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nor “legitimacy” is the overriding concern for Justice Kennedy. The
lack of clarity for strict scrutiny produces a confusing analysis, espe-
cially with respect to narrow tailoring, which depends on both an
understanding of the interest being evaluated as well as the ratio-
nale for strict scrutiny.
Without clearly understanding the rationale for strict scrutiny, as-
sessing the logic of narrow tailoring or its requirements is difficult.
Narrowly tailored efforts must not only be tailored to the interest
asserted, but must also be comprehensible within the framework of
strict scrutiny. If the purpose of strict scrutiny were simply to ensure
benign motivation, then narrow tailoring would not be necessary,
let alone a critical inquiry. This is because narrow tailoring itself has
little bearing on the motives or interests asserted but primarily en-
sures that the use of race is as limited as possible.69 Narrow
tailoring’s primary work is not to screen for or “smoke out” illegiti-
mate motives but to minimize what the Justices perceive as the
burden or cost to innocent parties.70 Understanding narrow tailor-
ing’s function in this way helps explain the exhaustion requirement
as well as the Court’s increasing emphasis on narrow tailoring in its
strict scrutiny analysis in this context.
II. THE LIMITS OF EXHAUSTION
As noted, the Court’s holding that narrow tailoring requires the
“reviewing court . . . be satisfied that no workable race-neutral alter-
native would produce the educational benefits of diversity . . . about
as well and at tolerable administrative expense”71 is the most impor-
tant statement of law arising from Fisher. This articulation of narrow
tailoring appears to be a departure from precedent. Although
seeming to clarify narrow tailoring requirements, this holding in-
stead may shift ambiguity from one area to another. While
exhaustion of race-neutral alternatives is now a mandatory exercise,
the precise meaning and scope of the exhaustion requirement re-
mains unclear.
69. As noted supra note 66, the conservative Justices’ emphasis on narrow tailoring in
recent cases suggests the more important function of strict scrutiny to minimize the harms of
even sanctioned or compelling uses of race.
70. At times, the Court is more candid about this fact. As it explained in Grutter, “Even
remedial race-based governmental action generally remains subject to continuing oversight
to assure that it will work the least harm possible to other innocent persons competing for
the benefit.” 539 U.S. at 341 (internal quotations omitted).
71. Fischer, 133 S. Ct. at 2420.
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Although Justice O’Connor famously explained that strict scru-
tiny is not “strict in theory, but fatal in fact,”72 Justice Kennedy
countered with the rhetorical rejoinder that strict scrutiny should
not be “feeble in fact” either.73 What facts must be presented to
satisfy a court that no workable race-neutral alternatives are viable?
What degree of certainty is called for in order to satisfy the review-
ing court? How are we to understand the standard of ‘tolerable
administrative expense’? Where is the threshold for tolerable ex-
pense or the line between tolerable and intolerable expense?
The exact meaning and scope of the exhaustion requirement will
be a focus of inquiry on remand.74 Although the University of Texas
issued a statement that the Supreme Court’s decision would not
affect their admissions policies following the ruling,75 on remand
UT will be called upon to present evidence as to why race-neutral
alternatives are insufficient to achieve its pedagogical objectives. In
particular, the university will be pressed to explain why the TPP is
insufficient to achieve its goals, especially given the ways in which
the TPP has evidently increased the levels of racial diversity in the
undergraduate student body after Hopwood.76
Establishing the necessity of the additional race-conscious, holis-
tic admissions procedure is not an impossible showing, but it will be
arduous and fact-intensive. Specific findings regarding the limita-
tions of the TPP in producing student body diversity in a variety of
settings will be critical. Moreover, any social scientific research that
72. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237.
73. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421.
74. At the time of this writing, the briefing in the Fifth Circuit has not yet been com-
pleted, but Plaintiff-Appellant has already argued that race-neutral alternatives (such as the
TTP) promote racial diversity as well, or about as well, as race-conscious efforts. See Plaintiff-
Appellant’s Supplemental Brief at 34-35, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (5th Cir. argued Nov.
13, 2013) (No. 09-50822), 2013 WL 5603455 (“Even assuming that race was a decisive factor
for each student admitted outside the operation of the Top 10% law, UT’s use of race still
could only have added, at most, 58 African-American and 158 Hispanic students to an in-state
class of 6,322.”).
75. See University of Texas President Responds to Supreme Court Ruling, THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT
AUSTIN (June 24, 2013), http://www.utexas.edu/news/2013/06/24/university-of-texas-at-aus-
tin-president-responds-to-supreme-court-ruling/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2013).
76. See Enrollment of First-Time Freshman Minority Students Now Higher than Before Hopwood
Court Decision, THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.utexas.edu/news/
2003/01/29/nr_diversity/ (“A report by the university’s Office of Institutional Research for
the 2002 fall/summer enrollment shows there were 266 African Americans, 932 Hispanics
and 942 Asian Americans enrolled as first-time freshmen at the [UT] in 1996. The numbers
of African Americans and Hispanics dropped after the Hopwood ruling, although the figures
for Asian Americans increased. In 1997, the numbers for first-time freshmen were down to
190 African Americans, 892 Hispanics and 1,130 Asian Americans.”) Not until 2002—and
many years after TPP became law in 1997—did first-time freshman enrollment for all three
ethnic groups increase to a level above the 1996 pre-Hopwood figures. In the Fall of 2002,
enrollment included 272 African Americans, 1,137 Hispanics and 1,452 Asian Americans. Id.
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can be advanced on what may constitute a critical mass to create a
diversity of viewpoints, so that minority students are not tokenized,
may be relevant inquiries on remand.77 The sociological complexity
of race underscores the limits of exhaustion.
Race is best understood as a socio-cultural location in American
society.78 As a social construction, race is not an essential or static
characteristic but a dynamic one.79 Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myr-
dal, in his epic treatise An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and
Modern Democracy, was the first to understand that race was visible in
almost every domain of American life but wholly explainable by
none. What bound race together and made it comprehensible as an
independent variable was the effects of each domain on the
others.80 It is the interaction of domains such as housing, educa-
tion, employment, and health, to take but a few, that explains
racialized outcomes.81 The attempt to explain or measure the ef-
fects of racial discrimination in any particular domain is necessarily
incomplete.
If race is a socio-cultural location, then the more factors one con-
siders that correlate to race, the closer one may approximate race.
Conversely, a single-factor approach will fail to capture the disad-
vantage experienced by marginalized racial groups.82 Nonetheless,
if race (both measured outcomes along racial categories and the
77. See Plaintiff-Appellant’s Supplemental Brief supra note 74, at 25–33.
78. See JOHN A. POWELL, RACING TO JUSTICE: TRANSFORMING OUR CONCEPTIONS OF SELF
AND OTHER TO BUILD AN INCLUSIVE SOCIETY 54 (2012) (“Because of its socially constructed
nature, the meaning attributed to a racially identified group or characteristic depends to a
great extent on the sociohistorical context in which the racing occurs, and racial meaning
varies across time and space.”).
79. Although race was perceived, like sex, to be an immutable, inherited characteristic,
race as a social construction is no longer viewed that way. Rather, racial categories are folk
taxonomies and are better understood as dynamic and fluid. A careful history of race illus-
trates this. See generally MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S (2d ed. 1994); AUDREY SMEDLEY & BRIAN D. SMEDLEY,
RACE IN NORTH AMERICA: ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF A WORLDVIEW (4th ed. 2012).
80. See GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DE-
MOCRACY 75-79 (1944). Myrdal explains, “The unity is largely the result of cumulative
causation binding them all together in a system and tying them to white discrimination. It is
useful, therefore, to interpret all the separate factors from a central vantage point—the point
of view of the Negro problem.” Id. at 77. “In an interdependent system of dynamic causation
there is no ‘primary cause’ but everything is cause to everything else.” Id. at 78.
81. See LIVING AND LEARNING: LINKING HOUSING AND EDUCATION POLICY 15 (john a. pow-
ell et al. eds. 2001); see also STEPHEN MENENDIAN & CAILIN WATT, KIRWAN INSTITUTE FOR THE
STUDY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY, DRAFT: Systems Thinking and Race (Dec. 2008), available at
http://www.kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/reports/2008/12_2008_SystemsThinkingandRace_Pri
mer.pdf.
82. MYRDAL, supra note 80, at 1069 (“This conception of a great number of interdepen-
dent factors, mutually cumulative in their effects, disposes of the idea that there is one
predominant factor, a ‘basic factor.’ . . . [T]his one-factor hypothesis is not only theoretically
unclear, but is contradicted by easily ascertainable facts and factual relations.”).
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social construction of the categories or racial classification schemes
themselves) is the emergent property of interacting factors, it is
conceivable that race could be deconstructed into its constituent
parts and retain much of the same analytic and explanatory force.
Race may not be explainable in terms of any single variable, but if
we disaggregate all of the variables that explain race, in theory we
could employ those factors, in lieu of race, as race-proxies or corre-
lates to accomplish the same ends that race is serving.
The argument that using race as a factor is necessary to achieve
racial diversity or reduce racial isolation and, further, that race-neu-
tral alternatives are insufficient, is not a conceptual or theoretical
claim but primarily a practical one. The relative disadvantage of
certain racialized populations results from dozens of demographic,
social, and economic factors that vary across geographic areas and
local conditions.83 The convergence of these factors with race
makes race a particularly useful consideration in understanding life
chances, but this clustering also makes it vexing to untangle and
analyze the various factors that explain race. Given the number of
the variables that contribute to racial disadvantage and complexity
of their interaction, an admissions policy limited to race-neutral fac-
tors cannot easily capture their cumulative effect on educational
opportunity.84 While there may be administrative reasons to view at
race as the sum of its parts, this approach ignores the relationships
between the parts, and the emergent properties of complex systems
that result and constitute race itself.
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Parents Involved, the
Jefferson County School Board, under the leadership of Superin-
tendent Pat Todd, adopted a revised student assignment policy
designed to maintain student body diversity.85 The successfully
83. Id. at 75–79. See also Brief of Social and Organizational Psychologists as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345).
84. See Rebecca Blank, Tracing the Economic Impact of Cumulative Discrimination, 95 AM.
ECON. REV. 99 (May 2005) (“Current social science efforts to measure discrimination at a
decision-point within a specific domain may seriously understate the impact of discrimina-
tion.”). Id. at 99–100. For a more comprehensive study of the cumulative effects of
neighborhood conditions, see ROBERT SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE EN-
DURING NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT 100 (2013) (“I argue that disadvantage is not encompassed in
a single characteristic but rather is a synergistic composite of social factors that mark the
qualitative aspects of growing up in severely disadvantaged neighborhoods.”).
85. See Sarah Diem, The Relationship Between Policy Design, Context, and Implementation in
Integration Plans, ED. POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES, Aug. 13, 2012, at 19 [hereinafter Diem, The
Relationship Between Policy Design, Context, and Implementation in Integration Plans], available at
http://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/article/view/958/993; see also Erica Frankenburg & Sarah Diem,
School Board Leadership and Policymaking in Changing Political Environments, 45 THE URBAN REV.
117 (2013), available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11256-012-0211-8; Em-
ily Bazelon, The Next Kind of Integration, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2008, at A38; Richard Day, JCPS
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challenged assignment policy had used individual racial classifica-
tions.86 Rather than relying on the race of individual students, the
revised student assignment policy looked at three geographic fac-
tors to devise new attendance zones: median household income,
the percentage of non-white students, and the average educational
attainment of adults.87 The idea of using multiple indicators in the
construction of attendance zones was based on research that sug-
gests a relationship between certain indicators and educational
opportunity.88 Single indicator approaches have also proven suc-
cessful, but they are less effective at creating racial diversity.89 These
factors were used to draw attendance zones that would then be used
in deciding student assignments and transfer requests. Elementary
schools would be required to meet the district’s guidelines. Al-
though this formula looked at race, it did so only at the
neighborhood or aggregate level in drawing attendance bounda-
ries. Thus, Jefferson County’s School Board sought to comply with
the Supreme Court’s ruling by not employing individual racial
classifications.90 These efforts, while maintaining some level of
Board Oks Revised Student-Assignment Plan, KENTUCKY SCHOOL NEWS AND COMMENTARY (January
12, 2012, 1:52 PM), http://theprincipal.blogspot.com/2012/01/jcps-board-oks-revised-stu
dent.html.
86. See Parents involved, 551 U.S. at 715–18 (describing the Jefferson County Public
Schools plan).
87. Diem, The Relationship Between Policy Design, Context, and Implementation in Integration
Plans, supra note 85, at 19.
88. See generally MI-KYUNG BAEK ET AL., KIRWAN INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF RACE AND
ETHNICITY, K-12 DIVERSITY STRATEGIES FOR DIVERSE AND SUCCESSFUL SCHOOLS (July 2007),
available at http://www.educationjustice.org/assets/files/pdf/Resources/Policy/Integra
tion/K12%20Diversity.pdf. See also Erica Frankenburg, Voluntary Integration After Parents In-
volved: What does research suggest about available options? 8–20, (Harvard Law Sch., Working
Paper, Dec. 2007), available at http://www.charleshamiltonhouston.org/wp-content/up
loads/2013/11/Frankenberg-Voluntary-Integration-After-PICS.pdf (detailing various race-
neutral alternatives).
89. Id. The degree to which SES indicators may generate racial diversity depends on a
number of factors, including the strength of the regional correlation between race and class.
One notable successful example is the Wake County student assignment plan, which adopted
a race-neutral diversity policy based on income alone. See Bazelon, supra note 85, at 42 (“In
2000, after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit began to frown on the use of race
in student assignment — a harbinger of the Supreme Court’s stance last year — the district
began assigning kids to schools based on the income level of the geographic zone they lived
in. The aim was to balance the schools so that no more than 40 percent of the students at
each one come from a low-income area.”). In the first 2 years of the policy, 75% of schools
complied with both academic and FRL caps, and just less than two-thirds were racially di-
verse. Kathryn McDermott et al., Diversity, Race-Neutrality, and Austerity: The Changing Politics of
Urban Education 35–39 (Working Paper, Aug. 24, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1664683. See also Frankenburg & Diem, supra note 85, at 129.
90. A lawsuit against the District under the revised policy was dismissed for that reason.
See Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. v. Fell, 391 S.W. 3d 713 (Ky. 2012) (reinstating the ruling of
the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing the complaint). Dakarai Aarons, Jefferson Co. Schools
Sued Over Student-Assignment Plan, EDUCATION WEEK (June 17, 2010, 9:49 AM), http://blogs
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diversity, have not proved as successful as the individual use of
race.91
While multi-factor approaches may better capture particular
forms of disadvantage, they are less effective at producing raw nu-
merical racial diversity than individual racial classifications. The
reason for this is self-evident: although race-neutral factors may cor-
relate to race, they are necessarily less precise than race itself. In
addition, the use of race at the neighborhood level may help com-
pensate for the deficiencies in socio-economic considerations alone
because socioeconomic status is an imprecise channeling mecha-
nism for producing a diverse student body. For example, some
white students residing in hyper-segregated and predominantly
non-white neighborhoods are likely to be channeled through the
consideration of neighborhood demographics that would otherwise
not be re-assigned under a more direct assignment policy. To com-
pensate for these deficiencies, more factors are needed to ensure
greater precision in terms of desired outcomes. Consequently,
while approximating race, these approaches are far more complex
and resource intensive than using a simple race criterion, and re-
quire additional expertise or outside consultants.92
Other districts have followed suit and developed similar multi-
factor approaches. The Berkeley Unified School District imple-
mented a plan that manages parental choice for elementary schools
using a similar diversity index that calculates the percentage of stu-
dents of color, parental income level, and parental education
.edweek.org/edweek/District_Dossier/2010/06/jefferson_co_schools_sued_over.html; JCPS
Student Assignment Plan Lawsuit Dismissed, WHAS11 (Oct. 6, 2009, 6:46 PM), available at http:/
/www.whas11.com/news/local/64442732.html.
91. The initial data suggests some wide variances in race enrollments that were not ex-
perienced in the original voluntary integrative assignment plan. In the 2008–09 operation,
almost fifty percent of the elementary schools, for example, were outside of the desired
range. See Sarah Diem, Design Matters: The Relationship Between Policy Design, Context, and Imple-
mentation in Integration Plans Based on Voluntary Choice and Socioeconomic Status (May 2010)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin), at 145–46, Figure 8,
available at http://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/ETD-UT-2010-05-
909/DIEM-DISSERTATION.pdf?sequence=1. Part of the problem is that the plan was only
phased in for K–2nd grades, but the plan still showed much greater variances than expected.
92. See Diem, The Relationship Between Policy Design, Context, and Implementation in Integra-
tion Plans, supra note 85, at 5. (“Whether or not a SES-based integration can succeed depends
on a number of factors including: (a) the strength of association between race and income;
(b) the policies defining socioeconomic integration; (c) the relationship between racial and
income residential segregation in a school district; (d) the factors determining the school
assignment; and (e) the effect of the SES-based integration policy on families’ decisions as to
where to enroll their child, which includes within the neighborhood school district, outside
of the neighborhood district, or in private or public schools.”).
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level.93 The California State Court of Appeal upheld this plan under
California’s Proposition 209 on the grounds that it did “not con-
sider an individual student’s race at all when assigning the student
to a school” and therefore did not employ any racial
classifications.94
The Chicago Public Schools adopted a multi-factor plan that, in
contrast, does not rely on race, even at the neighborhood level.95
Previously, the Chicago Public Schools had been under a desegre-
gation mandate as part of a consent decree.96 After the decree was
lifted in 2009, the school district abandoned the use of individual
racial classifications.97 Subsequently, the Chicago Board of Educa-
tion adopted a new system as a new way of creating social and
economic diversity in the city’s selective schools. The key to the new
system is the creation of four non-contiguous zones or “tiers.” The
district evaluated its nearly 900 census tracts based upon five indica-
tors: median income, adult education, percentages of single-family
homes and homeowners, and the percentage of children living in
non-English-speaking households. A sixth criterion was added for
the 2011–12 school year: the performance of schools in that census
tract.98 The increasing complexity of these plans in terms of num-
ber and sophistication of factors considered suggests the relative
difficulty of promoting racial diversity without resorting to individ-
ual racial classifications, let alone race at the neighborhood level.
These plans have been laboriously developed using available
demographic data with the help of consultants and student assign-
ment experts. The question of whether a race neutral alternative
93. See BUSD Student Assignment Plan/Policy, BERKELEY PUBLIC SCHOOLS (last visited Mar.
2, 2014), http://www.berkeleyschools.net/information-on-berkeley-unifieds-student-assign-
ment-plan/. The plan uses these factors to create “composite diversity averages” derived from
the planning areas students live in. Using three composite diversity categories, students are
then assigned proportionately to elementary schools.
94. American Civil Rights Found. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 172 Cal. App. 4th 207,
211 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
95. See Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah, Kids from Areas with Low-Performing Schools Get Boost from
CPS, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, (Nov. 04, 2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-11-04/
news/ct-met-cps-admissions-new-20101104_1_magnet-schools-worst-elementary-schools-low-
performing-schools.
96. See Consent Decree Memorandum Opinion, United States v. Board of Educ. (No. 80-
C-5124, N.D. Ill., Sept. 24, 2009), available at http://www.cps.edu/About_CPS/Departments/
Law/Documents/ConsentDecree.pdf.
97. CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOL TIERS, http://cpstiers.opencityapps.org/about.html (last
visited Nov. 13, 2013); see Sarah Karp, Federal Judge Ends Chicago Schools Desegregation Decree,
CHICAGO CATALYST (Sept. 24, 2009), http://www.catalyst-chicago.org/notebook/2009/09/
24/federal-judge-ends-chicago-schools-desegregation-decree.
98. HOW THE TIERS ARE CALCULATED - CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOL TIERS, http://cpstiers
.opencityapps.org/tier-calculation.html#footnote-2 (last visited April 5, 2014).
922 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 47:4
would perform “about as well and at tolerable administrative ex-
pense” is critical, as the efficacy of these plans and others like them
has borne out. The administrative expense of developing race-neu-
tral plans goes far beyond the resources of most admissions
committees, let alone school boards and administrative staff, when
compared to the cost of using racial classifications in either student
assignment or admissions review.99 Race-neutral alternatives are far
more complex in design and operation, and the initial data from
the Jefferson County Public School plan suggests that they may not
be as effective as programs based on the individualized considera-
tion of race.100 The other plans modeled on the JCPS plan have not
yet been in operation long enough to be fairly evaluated.
The question of allowable tolerances and administrative expense
and difficulty is a significant practical issue and may well loom
larger on remand in Fisher and in future cases than members of the
Court may have envisioned. Scaling multi-factor approaches to the
university level requires not only far more data collection and analy-
sis than is needed in other contexts, but at a much larger
geographic scale, often state-wide or beyond. The practical conse-
quence of exhaustion may well mean the abandonment of any
effort to promote racial inclusion. It will be politically difficult to
return to race-specific approaches once race-neutral alternatives
have proven less effective or administratively intolerable.101
III. BEYOND RACE UNCONSCIOUSNESS
In her brief dissent, Justice Ginsburg sarcastically noted that
“only an ostrich could regard the supposedly neutral [ten-percent
plan] as race unconscious.”102 As she accurately observed, “Texas’s
percentage plan was adopted with racially segregated neighbor-
hoods and schools front and center stage.”103 Since none of the
99. The Kirwan Institute was able to provide pro bono consulting  to districts such as
Jefferson County on account of the fact that it received generous grant support from the
Ford Foundation.
100. Kathryn McDermott et al., supra note 89, at 20–22. The new policy has faced various
challenges, particularly regarding issues of transportation and transfer requests. Some stu-
dents have had to travel longer distances to school. Transfer requests from parents with
students in Kindergarten and first grade significantly increased in 2009–10 school year and
has continued to grow.
101. Experience suggests that the political will needed to implement a race-conscious
student assignment plan is usually difficult to reassemble once it is has dissipated.
102. Fisher, 133 S.Ct. at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
103. Id.
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other Justices argued or held that the TPP was race-blind, these re-
marks may appear non sequitur. However, Justice Ginsburg is
addressing  the characterization of the TPP as race-neutral by Abi-
gail Fisher and her amici,104 and her dissent underscores the fact
that the TPP is only race-neutral in the narrow sense that it does not
employ racial classifications. Indeed, it was designed and adopted
to accomplish the same ends and yet evade heightened judicial
scrutiny.105
Beyond rebutting the notion that the TPP is colorblind, Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent also draws attention to the incongruity of strictly
scrutinizing a race-conscious plan that uses race as one of many fac-
tors in admissions while tacitly endorsing another race-conscious
plan designed to achieve the same goals without using race at the
individual level. Although these plans share the same objective, the
TPP represents a less direct means.106 To highlight this incongru-
ence, Justice Ginsburg asserts her preference for policies that are
explicit: “I remain convinced, those that candidly disclose consider-
ation of race [are] preferable to those that conceal it.”107 This, of
course, runs contrary to the Court’s usual treatment of race, which
incentivize government actors to conceal the extent of their race-
consciousness in order to avoid heightened judicial scrutiny.108
Justice Ginsburg is not suggesting that the Court subject the TPP
to heightened review but rather, in a common sense manner, draw-
ing attention to the paradox of subjecting different forms of race-
conscious policymaking to such disparate standards. In this way, she
carries the argument four dissenters advanced in Parents Involved
and stakes out a position that appreciates the difference between
invidious and integrative policies. This is a position that the Court
jettisoned in Bakke, which rejected the longstanding assumption ex-
plicated in Carolene Products footnote 4 that heightened scrutiny
should be reserved for those processes that burden “discrete and
104. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at 5 (“Despite the success of its race-neutral
system in increasing minority enrollment. . . .” (referring to the TTP)); see also Brief For the
Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appellant Urging Reversal at 26, Fisher v.
Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2013) (No. 09-50822) (“[T]he University enrolls
more than ‘meaningful numbers,’ Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338, of both black and Hispanic stu-
dents under Texas’s race neutral Top 10% Law.”).
105. Fisher, 133 S.Ct. at 2433.
106. This is because the TPP only accounts for race at the district level, a larger unit than
either individual racial classification, as were used pre-Hopwood, or neighborhood classifica-
tions, as were used in Jefferson County post-Parents Involved.
107. Id. at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 305 n.11
(2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)) (Internal quotations omitted).
108. See Reva Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision
in Race Equality Cases. 120 YALE L. J. 1279, 1359 (2011) (arguing that the Court is concerned
with the expressive nature of the use of race).
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insular minorities.”109 By preserving this distinction, Justice Gins-
burg’s dissent indicates a willingness to fight another day.
The exhaustion requirement introduces a circular irony into
strict scrutiny analysis. If the use of race requires the exhaustion of
workable race-neutral alternatives to satisfy strict scrutiny, then the
use of those alternatives would not trigger strict scrutiny in the first
place. Consequently, in the case of race-neutral alternatives, the
government interest being pursued need only be legitimate rather
than ‘compelling’ or even ‘important’ as strict or intermediate scru-
tiny require. In addition, the means to achieve that objective need
not be precise but only ‘rationally related’ to that interest.110
If narrow tailoring requires the exhaustion of race-neutral alter-
natives, then the interest those alternatives serve need not be
compelling because strict scrutiny would not apply. Rational basis
review would then presumably apply to race-neutral alternatives
(such as socio-economic status), even though they are race-con-
scious. In Bakke, the Court rejected the argument that “remedying
societal discrimination” was a compelling governmental interest
that justified the use of racial classifications.111 Yet, that interest may
well be (and probably would be) considered legitimate under ra-
tional basis review.112 That interest could be pursued relentlessly
through the use of race-neutral alternatives because race-neutral al-
ternatives would not trigger strict scrutiny review. In other words,
the exhaustion requirement demands evaluation of approaches
that would not be subject to strict scrutiny review and, therefore,
narrow tailoring.
Justice Ginburg’s Fisher dissent underscores the strange gulf be-
tween the scrutiny applied to race-conscious policies that employ
racial classifications and the scrutiny applied to race-conscious poli-
cies that do not employ individual racial classifications. With
respect to the latter, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Parents In-
volved is perhaps the most illuminating statement on the range of
109. See generally Ian Haney Lopez, A Nation of Minorities: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary
Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1034–39 (2007) (arguing that Bakke represented a rejec-
tion of the Carolene Product footnote 4 constitutional framework).
110. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(“The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid, and will be sustained if the
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”). This is
an example of rational basis review and the standard for rational basis review.
111. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (referring to societal discrimination as “an amorphous con-
cept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past.”).
112. See generally id. at 307 (The Court in Bakke held that remedying societal discrimina-
tion was not “compelling”); Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 789 (“These mechanisms are race
conscious but do not lead to different treatment based on a classification that tells each
student he or she is to be defined by race, so it is unlikely any of them would demand strict
scrutiny to be found permissible.”).
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permissible race-neutral alternatives, because it provides a func-
tional guidance checklist of permissible race-conscious, but
simultaneously race-neutral, possibilities:
School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together stu-
dents of diverse backgrounds and races through other means,
including strategic site selection of new schools; drawing at-
tendance zones with general recognition of the demographics
of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs;
recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and track-
ing enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race.
These mechanisms are race conscious but do not lead to dif-
ferent treatment based on a classification that tells each
student he or she is to be defined by race, so it is unlikely any
of them would demand strict scrutiny to be found
permissible.113
How might we apply these ideas to a post-Fisher environment?
Within the parameters of the law set out in Grutter, universities en-
joy wide latitude to fashion student bodies best suited to their
pedagogical goals. Since virtually all universities, even elite private
colleges, include the service and improvement of the society as part
of their mission,114 as well as the development the next generation
of leaders, admissions criteria may logically emphasize the role of
universities as a ladder of economic and social mobility. An oppor-
tunity index methodology is one method for accomplishing this.
Multi-factor approaches are compelling because they not only
paint a more vivid portrait of the underlying structural conditions
but are also more narrowly tailored to particular forms of disadvan-
tage. As described in Part II, a single indicator cannot capture the
myriad factors that influence an individual’s life chances. For this
reason, all admissions processes rely on more than one indicator to
113. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 789. Illustrating the guidance function of Justice Ken-
nedy’s concurrence, the Departments of Justice and Education issued joint guidance that
quotes and relies on Justice Kennedy’s statement. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC., GUIDANCE ON THE VOLUNTARY USE OF RACE TO ACHIEVE DIVERSITY AND AVOID RACIAL
ISOLATION IN ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS (last modified 2012), available at http://
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/guidance-ese-201111.html.
114. See generally Lani Guinier, Comment, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at
the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113 (2003) (describing the incongruence
between university and professional schools’ mission statements—which are very public-ori-
ented—and their admissions policies).
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select admitted students.115 However, traditional forms of merit-
based selection typically reward socioeconomically advantaged stu-
dents.116 SAT scores, for example, correlate more strongly to
grandparent wealth than any other factor, even IQ.117 Affirmative
action programs and similar attempts to identify historically disad-
vantaged students seek to compensate for the limitations present in
traditional admissions criteria. Opportunity scoring is a sophisti-
cated multi-factor methodology that better captures disadvantage
than a single indicator.118
Opportunity scoring creates an index of factors which correlate
to and causally explain life outcomes and projected life chances.119
Over time, this methodology has become more sophisticated and
refined as additional indicators are added under key opportunity
domains. The opportunity mapping methodology seeks to under-
stand the distribution of opportunity over space. Given this
geographic dimension, these indices can be represented using geo-
graphic information technology in the form of opportunity maps.120
This methodology has been applied in numerous contexts: siting
for low-income housing, targeting areas for employment and infra-
structure investment, deployment of social services, and, following
Parents Involved, creating attendance zones for K–12 student assign-
ment policies.121 At the Kirwan Institute, we assisted in developing a
115. Most universities, at a minimum, look at applicants’ grades and test scores and fre-
quently consider additional factors. See, e.g., Freshman Admission, THE OHIO STATE UNIV. (last
visited Mar. 2, 2014), http://undergrad.osu.edu/admissions/freshman/index.html.
116. Seventy-four percent of the students at the 146 most selective four-year colleges and
universities in the US come from the top socioeconomic quarter of American families, com-
pared to only three percent who come from the bottom quarter. Robert Haveman and
Timothy Smeeding, The Role of Higher Education in Social Mobility, OPPORTUNITY IN AMERICA,
VOL. 16, NO. 2 (Fall 2006), available at http://futureofchildren.org/publications/journals/
article/index.xml?journalid=35&articleid=90&sectionid=550.
117. Mary Beth Marklein, SAT Scores Show Disparities by Race, Gender, Family Income, USA
TODAY (Aug. 26, 2009), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/education/2009-08-25-SAT-
scores_N.htm. In 2009, the highest average score on the SAT was posted by students who
reported their family income as greater than $200,000 annually. Id.
118. Opportunity scoring is an example of the kinds of sophisticated and expensive ap-
proaches the Court is demanding, as noted in Part II.
119. See generally Opportunity Mapping Initiative and Project Listing, KIRWAN INSTITUTE FOR
THE STUDY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY (last visited MAR. 2, 2014), http://kirwaninstitute.osu
.edu/opportunity-communities/mapping/. The opportunity scoring process is the predicate
for the development of maps. “Opportunity mapping is a research tool used to understand
the dynamics of ‘opportunity’ within metropolitan areas. The purpose of opportunity map-
ping is to illustrate where opportunity rich communities exist (and assess who has access to
these communities) and to understand what needs to be remedied in opportunity poor com-
munities. Opportunity mapping builds upon the rich history of using neighborhood-based
information and mapping to understand the challenges impacting our neighborhoods.” Id.
120. For a list of initiatives, see id.
121. See id. See also KIRWAN INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY (last visited
April 5, 2014), http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/school-assignment-planning-montclair-new-
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sophisticated opportunity index that was implemented in Mont-
clair, New Jersey.122
The Superintendent of Montclair schools, Dr. Frank Alvarez,
reached out to the Kirwan Institute after Parents Involved and re-
quested technical support and expert advice to ensure the district’s
magnet school student assignment policy complied with the deci-
sion. The district convened a subcommittee to begin reviewing the
magnet school assignment plan. The committee worked with the
Kirwan Institute to develop recommendations for a new school as-
signment policy that would reduce economic and racial isolation,
guarantee a high quality education for every child, and comply with
the law.
The Kirwan Institute’s research on census and district level data
suggested that a neighborhood schools policy would produce dra-
matic resegregation within the district, particularly at schools in the
northern and southern areas of  town.123 In addition, a longitudinal
review of the district’s enrollment patterns under the magnet
school plan revealed that although the district wide magnet school
system had succeeded in producing elementary schools that are far
more racially integrated than the district as a whole, Montclair had
experienced slippage over time on account of changing
demographics.
The Kirwan Institute recommended that the district use four op-
portunity indicators along with neighborhood racial demographics
to develop geographic zones that would inform magnet school as-
signments.124 These opportunity factors were weighted into a
composite index, which divided the district into either two, three,
jersey/; KIRWAN INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY (last visited April 5, 2014),
http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/85-102-Kirwan-AP-Final-10-10-
for-singles-1.pdf; KIRWAN INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY (last visited April
5, 2014), http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/opportunity-communities/education/student-as
signment-plans/.
122. For our presentation to the Board of Education, see KIRWAN INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY
OF RACE AND ETHNICITY & MPS SCHOOL INTEGRATION TASK FORCE, PRESENTATION: PRESERVING
STRONG AND INTEGRATED SCHOOLS IN MONTCLAIR (Dec. 2009) [hereinafter PRESENTATION:
PRESERVING STRONG AND INTEGRATED SCHOOLS IN MONTCLAIR], available at http://www.mont
clair.k12.nj.us/ArticleFiles/537/kirwan.pdf. For a broader look at our work, see KIRWAN INSTI-
TUTE FOR THE STUDY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY, FINAL REPORT: MONTCLAIR PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
FOCUS GROUPS, OCT. 23RD-25TH 2009 (2010), available at http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/
school-assignment-planning-montclair-new-jersey/.
123. See PRESENTATION: PRESERVING STRONG AND INTEGRATED SCHOOLS IN MONTCLAIR,
supra note 122, at 15–16 (neighborhood schools map).
124. After careful review, the opportunity indicators selected were median household in-
come, parental education levels, free or reduced lunch, and poverty concentration.
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or four zones.125 The school district could use these opportunity
zones to approximate student profiles, ensuring that students from
different backgrounds are distributed throughout the school sys-
tem. Such a plan was intended to ensure equitable educational
opportunities for each child and maximize student achievement.
Using zones, as opposed to requesting individual data, is also less
intrusive since it would not require any additional data collection
from parents.126 The opportunity index does not displace the use of
other factors, such as special needs, siblings, or ESL (English as Sec-
ond Language), and functions within the context of a parental
choice mechanism.127 Parents would rank their preferred school
choices, and those choices would be maximized to the extent possi-
ble within the zone assignment ranges. The district would use the
opportunity index to create zones that would have both a floor and
a ceiling on student representation from each zone within each
school and would pursue parental choice within those limits. Stu-
dents from underrepresented zones would then have an advantage
in assignment to those schools. In this way, integration would work
in all directions. Students from low opportunity zones would be
given preference for schools that have a disproportionate number
of students from higher opportunity neighborhoods and vice versa.
The Kirwan Institute mapped a two-zone, three-zone, and four-
zone plan, both with and without race as a factor, and presented
these plans to both the district’s subcommittee and selected school
board members.128 That committee adopted our recommendation
to use the opportunity zone plan129 and forwarded the “three-zone
plan with race included” to the school board, which then approved
this plan.
125. For map of the zones, see Freedom of Choice School Selection and Assignment Policy Ex-
plained, MONTCLAIR PUBLIC SCHOOLS (last visited Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.montclair.k12.nj
.us/Article.aspx?Id=671.
126. The data used to create opportunity index scores may be sensitive personal data
derived from aggregate census sources. A school district’s request for individual data on in-
formation such as race, education, and income may be perceived as intrusive and
unnecessary when it can be obtained from census or other data sources.
127. Siblings, special needs, and ESL students would all be given priority placement
above diversity assignment within the opportunity zone methodology. Sibling placement en-
sures that siblings attend the same schools. Students with special needs may require access to
special needs programs located in specific schools.
128. The “with race” plan refers to a plan in which race at the neighborhood level was
used as one of the index factors.
129. Board Weighing School Assignment By “Zone”, MONTCLAIR PUBLIC SCHOOLS (Jan. 13,
2010), http://www.montclair.k12.nj.us/Article.aspx?Id=537; Freedom of Choice School Selection
and Assignment Policy Explained, MONTCLAIR PUBLIC SCHOOLS (May 9, 2011), http://www.mont
clair.k12.nj.us/Article.aspx?Id=671.
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Universities can use opportunity index scoring to target the most
educationally disadvantaged students and generate racial and other
forms of diversity. Applicants can be given an opportunity score
based on a mixture of individual and geographic characteristics.
For example, given an index of a particular region, universities
could go so far as to set a firm quota that 20% of their admittees are
accepted from low opportunity census tracts. Opportunity indices
are generally divided into quintiles: very high, high, moderate, low,
and very low. The school could also award a mechanical bonus in
the admissions process to students who were raised or currently re-
side in neighborhoods in low or very low opportunity census areas.
This would not violate the Court’s prohibition against racial quotas
or mechanical use of race, because such bonuses are based on geo-
graphic residence, not race. This process employs a mixture of
geographic and socio-economic diversity. Yet, because the vast ma-
jority of African American families reside in low or very low
opportunity census areas, this would have a positive effect on racial
diversity.130 In addition, the intense hyper-segregation of Black and
Latino families increases the probability that a geographic diversity
plan would work.
The primary restriction on race-conscious admissions is in using
racial classifications; that is, admitting or denying admission to an
130. Research at the Kirwan Institute suggests that African-Americans and Latinos tend to
be disproportionately located within the lower opportunity areas, even after controlling for
income level. The Kirwan Institute’s two-year research study of Ohio found that Black
Ohioans are disproportionately concentrated into the lowest opportunity neighborhoods. See
KIRWAN INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY, THE STATE OF BLACK OHIO: AT A
CROSSROADS ON THE PATHWAY TO OPPORTUNITY 47 (2010), available at http://gis.kirwaninsti
tute.org/reports/2010/03_2010_TheStateofBlackOhio.pdf. Nearly three in four Black
Ohioans, one in two Latino Ohioans, and one in four Asian and White Ohioans were found
in the State’s very low and low opportunity neighborhoods (which represent two-fifths of the
State’s total census tracts). Id. at 48–49. In Massachusetts, ninety-percent of African-American
and Latino households in 2000 were isolated in the lowest opportunity neighborhoods in the
State. See JASON REECE & SAMIR GAMBHIR, KIRWAN INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF RACE AND
ETHNICITY, THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: BUILDING OPPORTUNITY IN MASSACHUSETTS 2
(2009), available at http://www.kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/reports/2009/01_2009_Geography
ofOpportunityMassachusetts.pdf. By contrast, only 31% of White, Non-Latino households
were found in low-opportunity neighborhoods. Low-income Whites were not as concentrated
in low-opportunity communities as other races. Only 42% percent of low-income White
households were living in low-opportunity communities, compared to more than ninety-five
percent of low-income Latinos, and ninety-three percent of low-income African-Americans.
Id. at 3. In a study of Florida’s four major metropolitan regions, Miami-Dade, Orlando,
Tampa, and Jacksonville, seven out of ten African Americans and half of all Latinos live in
low opportunities areas, while only three out of ten non-Hispanic Whites live in such areas.
JASON REECE ET AL., KIRWAN INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY, HOW FAIR IS
FLORIDA? RECESSION, RECOVERY, EQUITY AND OPPORTUNITY IN FLORIDA 9 (2009), available at
http://www.kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/reports/2009/10_2009_FL_RecessionRecoveryEquity
.pdf.
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individual when that individual’s race is a factor in the decision ma-
trix. There is no presumption against using race in a
nondiscriminatory and non-individualistic ways, such as considering
the racial composition or demographics of an applicant’s neighbor-
hood or high school. Universities that seek to promote racial
diversity are not only free to create recruitment programs targeting
non-white neighborhoods or communities or to use opportunity
enrollment as either a bonus or a quota, but they may also target
predominantly non-white educational environments.131
Race and class increasingly segregate K–12 educational environ-
ments. One out of every six Black and one out of every nine Latino
students attend a hyper-segregated school—one in which the stu-
dent population is 99–100% racially or ethnically homogenous.132
Roughly two out of every five Black or Latino students in the United
States attend “intensely segregated schools,” where 90–100% of the
student body is racially homogenous, a percentage that is up from
one out of three in 1988.133 More than three quarters of these
schools are high-poverty schools.134
According to a 2012 report from The Civil Rights Project, 74% of
Black students attend majority nonwhite schools (50–100% minor-
ity) and 38% of Blacks attend intensely segregated schools (those
with only 0–10% of whites students) across the nation. 15% of Black
students attend “apartheid schools” across the nation, where whites
make up 0–1% of the enrollment. Apartheid schools are even more
pervasive in areas with large concentrations of Black and brown re-
sidents. For example, in Chicago and the surrounding
metropolitan area, half of the Black students attend apartheid
schools. In New York, one third of Black students attend such
schools.
It is important to recognize that these patterns reflect re-segrega-
tion by both race and class. Latino students attending intensely
131. See, e.g., UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, BUILDING ON EXCELLENCE: GUIDE TO RECRUITING
AND RETAINING DIVERSE GRADUATE STUDENTS AT UC BERKELEY, available at http://diver-
sity.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/Graduate_Diversity_Guide.pdf (emphasizing going
“beyond the ‘usual’ range of institutions from which you recruit to include minority serving
institutions such as historically black colleges and universities.”)
132. ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., Harv. Univ. Civil Rights Project, A Multiracial Society




133. Id. at 31.
134. GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, HARV. U. CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, RACIAL TRANSFOR-
MATION AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF SEGREGATION 31 (2006), available at http://
civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/racial-trans-
formation-and-the-changing-nature-of-segregation/orfield-racial-transformation-2006.pdf.
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segregated schools rose fourfold to 43% in 2008 from 12% in 1968
in the west.135 Similarly, Latino students are concentrated among
low-income students, and now nearly two-thirds of their classmates
are low-income, compared to one-third in the early 1990s.136 More-
over, this segregation is more pronounced across and between
school districts than within them.137 Since inter-district segregation
is now more salient than intra-district segregation, this presents an
opportunity for approaches like state or university “percent plans”
to generate the student body diversity reflected in their states. Simi-
larly, it is also an opportunity to use other forms of geographic
diversity. For example, universities could set a hard quota for
predominantly non-white school districts. This would channel iso-
lated student populations into diverse educational environments.
Given extant patterns of racial and socioeconomic segregation,
which appear to be accelerating as income inequality drives more
refined neighborhood differentiation,138 percentage plans will be
an effective means of ensuring that all students have an opportunity
to compete for admission to public universities for the foreseeable
future. However, opportunity methodology may answer some of the
concerns critics of percentage plans raise.
Some opponents of the TPP argued and continue to argue that
less qualified students are admitted through the TPP, as students
who fall outside of the top ten percent of more competitive school
districts may be better prepared and qualified than students from
the top ten percent of less competitive districts.139 Opportunity in-
dexing acknowledges the differential educational opportunities
primary and secondary education afforded students and empha-
sizes redressing those disadvantages as a public policy rather than as
a matter of college competitiveness or individual merit. Other crit-
ics of the TPP argue that it is flawed because it relies on underlying
patterns of segregation, which we should be working to integrate,140
and that we should not abandon racial diversity as an explicit goal
even as we pursue other forms of diversity. Opportunity indexing
acknowledges the differential access different racial groups enjoy.
135. Id. at 12.
136. Id. at 10.
137. See CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, AFTER “BROWN”: THE RISE AND RETREAT OF SCHOOL DE-
SEGREGATION (2004).
138. See SEAN F. REARDON & KENDRA BISCHOFF, US2010 PROJECT, GROWTH IN THE RESIDEN-
TIAL SEGREGATION OF FAMILIES BY INCOME, 1970-2009 (2011), available at http://www.s4.brown
.edu/us2010/Data/Report/report111111.pdf.
139. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae for Richard Sander and Stuart Taylor, Jr. in Support of
Neither Party, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345).
140. See, e.g., LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINERS CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RE-
SISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY (2003).
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This methodology would continue to produce racial diversity, even
as integrative efforts are pursued at the local level, by providing a
more granular portrait of each applicant’s educational opportunity.
Such a portrait would not rely on underlying patterns of segrega-
tion,as the TPP does, to define that opportunity.
CONCLUSION
Purporting to extend or affirm existing precedent, Fisher marks a
departure in both substance and form. This Article explored the
ways in which Fisher departed from precedent and proscribed new
limits on the use of affirmative action in higher education. In doing
so, this Article investigated the limits of the exhaustion requirement
in both theory and practice and suggested an alternative methodol-
ogy for fostering student body diversity and achieving the benefits
of racial diversity in lieu of individual racial classifications.
Fisher may preserve affirmative action in theory but will increas-
ingly burden such approaches in practice. The narrow tailoring
standards announced in Fisher are nearly impossible to satisfy and, if
satisfied by establishing the infeasibility of race-neutral alternatives
and necessity of race-explicit means, may foreclose the possibility of
returning to race-explicit measures as a political matter. Local com-
munities rarely adopt race-explicit measures except as part of a
settlement and, once such measures are abandoned, they are even
less likely to be reinstated.
One way to address the Court’s narrow tailoring concerns is to
demand that both lower courts and educational institutions clarify
and more deeply investigate the nature of the interests being pur-
sued. As noted, narrow tailoring is a context sensitive inquiry and
cannot be conducted or assessed beyond the interest being pur-
sued. Determining whether a university’s use of race is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest requires a
careful understanding of that interest. If the interest being pursued
is racial diversity or a critical mass of non-white students, the educa-
tional entity must have some role in defining that interest and
assessing tolerable expenses. Grutter recognized this and accorded
educational institutions some deference in this regard. The degree
of deference and whether such deference is strictly limited to the
compelling interest prong or extends to the narrow tailoring prong
is a debate between the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit in
Fisher, but it is largely beside the point. The inherent relationship
between the compelling interest and narrow tailoring prongs ren-
ders such a debate irrelevant at best and semantics at worst.
SUMMER 2014] The Limits of Exhaustion 933
The narrow tailoring and exhaustion requirements pose severe
administrative and technical challenges for admission committees
seeking racial diversity. This problem is a manifestation of a deeper
error that began in Bakke: heightened review for integrative mea-
sures. This error began when Justice Powell abandoned the
framework established under Carolene Products footnote four.141
Carolene Products set out the framework for heightened scrutiny.142
The predicate for footnote four’s heightened judicial scrutiny for
minority groups is not race or religion, but a “discreteness” and “in-
sularity.”143 Plessy had demanded only rational basis review for race-
based equal protection claims, and that extended only to legislation
‘intended to oppress or stigmatize.144 Carolene Products overturned
that framework with its famous footnote four. Bakke broke with that
framework by disconnecting heightened scrutiny from either dis-
creteness or insularity, declaring us a “nation of minorities” and
rejecting the view that either discreteness or insularity were precon-
ditions for strict scrutiny.145 Justices Breyer and  Ginsburg
established in previous cases that they would not subject integrative
measures to strict scrutiny review.
Racial classifications should not trigger strict scrutiny unless they
are connected to discrete and insular minorities, because it is those
conditions that warrant special constitutional solicitude. Unfortu-
nately, seven Justices have lent their imprimatur to strict scrutiny
for all racial classifications. Consequently, universities should ex-
plore the possibilities for race-conscious approaches that do not
run afoul of the Court’s racial classification jurisprudence. An op-
portunity-enrollment model is an alternative or complementary
admissions policy, despite the administrative challenges to develop
and implement this model on the scale of university admissions.
Pursuit of policies such as these will illustrate for the courts the lim-
its of a strict exhaustion requirement.  But it may also spur the
development of admissions processes that can better measure forms
of advantage relative to discrete and insular minorities for those
willing to incur the administrative expense.
141. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 293–95.
142. Id. at 1075.
143. See powell, supra note 34, at 1075–76.
144. See powell & Menendian, supra note 15, at 690 (“The Court asks if the legislation
mandating segregation is oppressive or stigmatizing.”).
145. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 92 (“During the dormancy of the Equal Protection Clause, the
United States had become a Nation of minorities.”).

